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A patent owner possesses a legal right of limited duration to exclude
competitors from using processes or manufacturing products that employ
technology within the scope of his patent grant.' An important aspect of
this legal right is the owner's discretion to license the patented technology2
and to restrict the manner in which it is put to use.3 Patent licensing and
licensing restrictions will generally permit the patent owner to exploit his
patent monopoly more efficiently. When courts have found the effect of a
licensing restriction to be anticompetitive, however, they have imposed an-
titrust sanctions to curb patent owners' licensing discretion.
In recent decisions, several courts have maintained that, unlike licensing
restrictions, refusals to license patents are exempt from antitrust scrutiny.4
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (establishing term of patent grant and exclusionary
right of patent owner).
2. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 185 (1980). A license is any
grant of a right to make, use, or sell a patent that does not constitute a complete transfer of patent
rights. See 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1 (2d ed. 1965). The licensing of a patent
is not governed by any specific provision of the Patent Act. Moraine Prods. v. ICI Am., Inc., 538 F.2d
134, 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976). Rather, the rights and obligations of parties to
a licensing agreement are construed in accordance with principles of contract law. 2 P. ROSENBERG,
PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 16.01[11][b] (rev. 2d ed. 1983).
3. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126-27 (1938) (field-of-
use restriction that prohibited licensee from manufacturing or selling amplifiers for use in talking
picture equipment); Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453, 458-59 (D. Del. 1964)
(sale restriction permitting non-exclusive licensees to manufacture and use products made using a
patented process but reserving to exclusive licensee right to sell products made using patented process).
For other types of restrictions that have survived antitrust scrutiny, see infra note 59.
4. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding unilateral refusal to
license patent cannot violate antitrust laws if patent was lawfully acquired), aff'g on other grounds
463 F. Supp. 983, 1014-15 (D. Conn. 1978) (Newman, J.) (holding unilateral refusal to license
patent not basis for monetary recovery under antitrust laws), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982);
accord GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 648 (9th Cir. 1981) (patent owner's right to refuse
to license competitors in domestic market cannot be challenged under antitrust laws merely because he
has licensed patent's use in foreign markets); cf Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S.
176, 213-15 (1980) (allowing patent owner to maintain action for contributory infringement against
seller of unpatented product that had no substantial use except in patented process that the patent
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Surprisingly, these courts have adopted this position with little analysis of
its legal foundations or of its economic consequences. A blanket exemption
from the antitrust laws for refusals to license a patent appears inconsistent
with the qualified exemption courts extend to licensing restrictions. Al-
though this doctrinal inconsistency is arguably based upon congressional
policy, it more likely reflects the inability of courts to surmount the practi-
cal obstacle of distinguishing refusals to license a patent that promote effi-
ciency from those that are anticompetitive.
This Note presents an economic and legal analysis of the antitrust is-
sues raised by a patent owner's unilateral refusal to license. It begins by
demonstrating that, under certain conditions, a refusal to license a patent
may facilitate a patent owner's effort to perpetuate beyond the patent's
lifetime the market power derived from his patent. The Note then argues
that a refusal for the purpose of enhancing future market power should be
considered a form of patent misuse; it is not privileged conduct protected
under the patent laws, and it should not be immune from antitrust
prohibitions. Because a refusal that constitutes patent misuse will invaria-
bly satisfy the elements of an offense under section 2 of the Sherman Act,5
this form of misuse violates the antitrust laws. To enable courts to distin-
guish efficient patent exploitation from anticompetitive conduct aimed at
perpetuating the patent owner's market power beyond the patent's expira-
tion, this Note, drawing upon recent contributions to the predatory pric-
ing literature, formulates a general test for evaluating a patent owner's
refusal to license a patent.
I. A Welfare Analysis of Patent Licensing
The intersection of antitrust prohibitions and patent rights presents
courts with a fundamental problem: how to reconcile antitrust policies,
which foster competition, with the use of limited patent monopolies to
owner refused to license); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir.
1979) (expressing doubt whether arbitrary refusal to license unpatented know-how is actionable
under Sherman Act). The Federal Trade Commission has concluded that a monopolist is under no
duty to license or disclose his technology to rivals. See In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96
F.T.C. 653, 748 n.40 (1980).
A "refusal to license," as used in this Note, refers both to a refusal at any price and a patent
owner's choice of a licensing fee intended to discourage applicants. At least one court has concluded,
that a patent owner is permitted to demand a royalty "so high as to preclude acceptance of a license
offer," because such conduct is "not appreciably different from a refusal to license upon any terms."
W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 623 (3d Cir. 1976). Because the court in Gore
assumed that a patent owner's refusal to license was unquestionably legal, it failed to consider the
circumstances under which the royalties demanded by a patent owner might violate the antitrust laws.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other persons to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign commerce). The Clayton Act
creates a private right of action for treble damages in favor of "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," id. § 15, or for injunctive
relief "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws," id. § 26.
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induce innovation. Although each statutory scheme seeks to promote social
welfare,' neither this common economic purpose nor conventional analysis
of antitrust issues suggests an obvious social welfare standard to apply in
patent-antitrust cases. The conventional economic approach to antitrust
evaluates a practice by looking at the static tradeoff it creates between
productive efficiency and allocative efficiency.7 Patent-antitrust analysis, in
contrast, seeks to balance dynamic gains in productive efficiency induced
6. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (noting that "Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription' ") (citing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978)); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480
(1974) (Congress established patent system to induce innovation in belief that it "will have a positive
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens"); see
also W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 1-7 (1973)
(arguing that consumer welfare maximization is common goal of both antitrust and patent laws).
Whether the promotion of social welfare (sometimes referred to as "consumer welfare") is the
exclusive goal of the antitrust laws, see R. BORK, supra, at 7, or merely an important factor to be
considered along with other non-economic concerns, see, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1177-80 (7th Cir.) (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 1051, 1052-58 (1979), there is no dispute as to the need for economic analysis in addressing
patent-antitrust issues.
7. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 6, at 91-110 (arguing that antitrust analysis should focus on the
effect of conduct on social welfare as measured by the sum of changes in allocative and productive
efficiency); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-offs, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 18 (1968) (applying same social welfare standard to mergers); see also W. BOWMAN, supra note
6, at 3-9 (suggesting that antitrust and patent law pose similar tradeoffs between efficiency and trade
restraint).
An economy exhibits productive efficiency when it is impossible to reallocate factors of production
to produce more of one output without producing less of some other output. See W. NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 520-32 (2d ed. 1978). For a single
industry, assuming all factor prices are fixed, productive efficiency means that output is produced at
the lowest possible cost for a given level of demand,
A resource allocation is allocatively efficient when resources are employed in producing goods that
consumers will most value. Allocative inefficiency exists when price exceeds marginal costs for the last
unit of output produced. Marginal cost, the cost of producing another unit of output, represents the
opportunity costs of output-that is, the value of the resources necessary to produce an additional unit
of output in their next best alternative use. If consumers are willing to pay more than it costs to
produce an additional unit of output, then resources are being employed in an alternative use that
consumers value less. This allocative inefficiency reduces social wealth.
The net effect of a particular practice on productive and allocative efficiency determines whether the
practice enhances or diminishes social welfare. This procedure is equivalent to adding up the net
changes in consumers' and producers' surplus in a market for a particular practice. See R. BOADWAY,
PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 58-61 (1979). Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between
what consumers are willing to pay and the price they actually pay. An approximation is given by the
area under an ordinary demand curve up to the quantity purchased, less the expenditures made by
consumers in purchasing that quantity. Producer surplus is the difference between total revenue and
total variable costs (the area under a producer's marginal cost curve) for the output produced. See,
e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 497-500 (4th ed. 1977); J. HIRSH-
LEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 212-24 (2d ed. 1980).
This social welfare standard, while generally illuminating, suffers from some well-known limita-
tions. First, there is no consideration of how the misallocation of resources in one market affects
resource allocation in other markets; thus, any conclusions are valid only for a partial rather than a
general equilibrium. Second, it assumes society is indifferent to the distribution of resources among
individuals. Finally, the social welfare standard is a static rather than dynamic measure of efficiency
and thus does not take account of the current market equilibrium's effect on future social welfare.
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by the patent system against static deadweight loss created by legal mo-
nopolies. The application of antitrust principles to the exploitation of pat-
ent rights must be tempered with an understanding of the economic basis
of a patent system and the economic incentives of patent owners in ex-
ploiting their patents.8 This Part defines a standard of socially efficient
patent exploitation and uses it to evaluate the role of the antitrust laws in
promoting socially efficient patent licensing.
A. The Economic Function of Patents
The primary economic justification for a patent system is the belief that
competitive markets will yield inadequate investment in innovation."
Competitive economies tend to underinvest in innovation because of the
inability of inventors to appropriate through the marketplace the marginal
social benefits of their inventions.1 Patents overcome this appropriability
problem and foster innovation by providing inventors property rights
through which to control the commercial exploitation of patented
processes or products.11
8. Cf Stiglitz, Potential Competition May Reduce Welfare, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.
184, 189 (1981) (antitrust policy should be based upon complete analysis of functioning of competition
in situations in which innovation is a crucial element because of possibility that simple policies may
easily lead to pareto-inferior outcomes); Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis of Physical Tie-Ins,
89 YALE L.J. 769, 771 n.16, 776-77 (1980) (arguing that social welfare criterion incorporating dy-
namic factors should be used to analyze antitrust issues involving tradeoffs between innovation and
competition in order to maximize long-run efficiency).
Dynamic efficiency extends the concepts of productive and allocative efficiency to describe the allo-
cation of resources between current and future uses. In production, resources can be used either to
satisfy present consumption or to produce future output (that is, to produce more machines that will
produce more goods tomorrow). In consumption, consumers may wish to forego current consumption
to raise their future consumption. Dynamic efficiency, in a pareto-optimal sense, exists if the marginal
rate at which consumers substitute between present and future consumption equals the marginal rate
at which the resources used in the production of present consumption can be transformed into the
production of future output. See R. BOADWAY, supra note 7, at 24-27; J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 7,
at 488-96.
Static deadweight loss is the dollar cost of allocative inefficiency in any period. In the case of a
single-price monopolist, the deadweight cost of monopoly equals the sum of consumers' and producers'
surplus lost on units of output not produced because of the monopolist's restriction of output.
9. Economists sometimes distinguish between invention and innovation. See R. NELSON & S.
WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 263-66 (1982). This distinction, how-
ever, is unimportant for the argument presented here, and therefore no distinction will be observed.
10. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615-16 (Nat'l Bureau for
Economic Research 1962). The main impediment to appropriability is the free rider problem, caused
by a competitor's ability to replicate inventions through imitation, and thereby to share in the inven-
tor's rewards while incurring only a fraction of the development costs borne by the inventor. Arrow
also argues that risk aversion is another reason why market economies systematically underinvest in
innovation. If a firm is risk averse, it will require positive expected economic profits to undertake
investment. Id. at 610-14. But see Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 569-72 (1971) (distinguishing technological
from pecuniary rewards to inventors).
11. Patent rights provide a direct remedy for the appropriability problem; a patent provides a
means for the inventor to capture, in the form of economic rents, a larger fraction of the consumer and
Patents and Predation
A patent system will increase the rate of innovation so that this rate
more closely approximates the socially optimal rate.12 The benefits of in-
creased innovation, however, are not without social costs. By restricting
the availability of technology already in the public domain, the patent sys-
tem creates both allocative and productive inefficiency. Having a legal mo-
nopoly over economically valuable technology1" allows a patent owner to
extract a premium for the use of that technology. This monopoly pre-
mium distorts the allocation of resources in the economy: Insufficient re-
sources are employed to produce goods that employ patented technology.
14
Furthermore, productive inefficiency is created because the diffusion of
patented technology is restricted; the most efficient technology is not em-
ployed by all firms in an industry. 5
producer surplus generated by his invention than he could have captured in the absence of patent
protection. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 23-28.
12. The socially optimal level of innovation is related to the concept of dynamic efficiency. A
necessary condition for this level is that the marginal benefits of innovation equal its marginal costs.
See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 10, at 623; Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 184. The marginal benefits of
innovation are the benefits society derives from having an invention sooner than otherwise would have
been the case. See Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY, PREDA-
TION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205, 231-33 (S. Salop ed. 1981) (criticizing view that proper mea-
sure of patent's value is total economic surplus contributed by new invention). The marginal costs of
innovation are the resources expended by society to realize an invention sooner.
A patent policy that seeks to induce the optimal level of innovation should fix a reward that equates
the costs and benefits of innovation at the margin. The marginal costs of using a patent system,
however, must be adjusted to reflect the deadweight loss caused by monopoly exploitation. See W.
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH & WELFARE 76 (1969) (discussing economic factors that determine
the optimal patent life). A patent system represents a second-best solution to the problem of inducing
sufficient levels of innovation. It may be the most effective method of inducing innovation, yet the
optimal level of innovation using a patent system will not be the same as the first-best optimum. See
id. at 87.
13. A patent's legal monopoly does not necessarily make a patent valuable in an economic sense.
See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440 (2d ed. 1980)
(suggesting that vast majority of patents are without value). An economically valuable patent must
either introduce some cost savings over current production techniques or offer an improved or entirely
new product. If it does neither, a patent will not have any value.
14. Allocative inefficiency occurs because the opportunity costs of making the technology available
to an additional user-costs that are presumably negligible-are far less than the price consumers
must pay to obtain the benefits of the technology. See Arrow, supra note 10, at 617. The social
welfare-maximizing price of a patent is zero, because once the patented technology exists, the margi-
nal costs of using it are zero. W. NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 86-87. Restricting the supply of the
technology embodied in the patent causes deadweight loss. Because a patent system necessarily entails
this deadweight loss, that system can never be an allocatively efficient method of inducing technical
change. Id.
Posner has argued in other contexts that the social cost of monopoly should also include expenditure
of resources in rent-seeking behavior. See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83
J. POL. ECON. 807, 809-15 (1975). This argument does not apply to monopolies like patents, where
the purpose of sanctioning the monopoly is to encourage investment in rent-seeking behavior related to
innovation. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 396 (arguing that some monopolies are by-product of
socially desirable activity); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 935 n.27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Posner, The Chicago School].
15. See R. NELSON & S. WINTER, supra note 9, at 330-31. The disclosure of the patented tech-
nology necessary in order to obtain the patent, however, ensures that, upon expiration of the patent,
the average technology will coincide more closely with the best technology than if the patented tech-
nology had not been disclosed. On balance, it is difficult to reach any firm conclusion about the
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A patent owner can appropriate the value of his patent from royalties
paid to him by other firms that use the patented technology1" or from the
additional producer surplus gained by using his patented technology in his
own products. 17 The value of any patent is thus dictated by the market-
place. By using the market to reward inventors, society encourages the
types of innovation that consumers value most,18 without making it neces-
sary for the government to determine the social value of inventions.1
B. A Standard of Socially Efficient Patent Exploitation
The patent system that Congress created reflects a tradeoff between dy-
namic and static efficiency. By establishing monopolies, Congress indi-
cated its willingness to accept some deadweight loss as the price of in-
creased innovation. At the same time, the limitations it placed on patent
monopolies with respect to both the types of invention for which monopo-
lies would be conferred2" and the duration of these monopolies, 21 express
a countervailing concern that society should not ignore the social costs of
inducing innovation.
Because the market determines both the value of the patent and its cost
to society, the actual tradeoff between the rate of invention and allocative
inefficiency will depend upon the manner in which a patent owner ex-
ploits his legal monopoly.22 In general, a patent owner's efforts to maxi-
benefits or costs of the effect of the patent system on innovation diffusion. See F. SCHERER, supra note
13, at 441-42.
16. In order to calculate the optimal royalty for a patent, the patent owner must find the quantity
for which the marginal costs of providing the patent to an additional user are equal to the marginal
revenues associated with the derived demand for the patented technology. See W. NORDHAUS, supra
note 12, at 71-73; McGee, Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J.L. & ECON.
135, 137-44 (1966).
17. A patent may increase producer surplus, see supra note 7, in two ways. First, it may reduce
marginal costs over the relevant range of output and thereby increase the total difference between
revenues and costs. Second, to the extent that a patent confers market power on a patent owner, the
owner will be able to increase his profits by raising price and restricting output. The consumer sur-
plus he captures from higher prices on the restricted output will more than offset the producer surplus
he loses on foregone production.
18. W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 38; Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 274 (1966).
19. Baxter, supra note 18, at 273; . Coase, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Appli-
cations, 1 BELL J. ECON. 113, 116-21, 123-24 (1970) (arguing that regulatory schemes based on
market signals reflect consumer satisfaction better than decisions made exclusively by government
agencies). Arrow has questioned whether a market-oriented patent system will provide adequate in-
centives for firms to engage in basic research. Arrow, supra note 10, at 617-18. But see W. BOWMAN,
supra note 6, at 26, 37 (noting that patent system's deficiencies with respect to encouraging basic
research could be remedied by separate governmental initiatives).
20. Only inventions that are new, useful, and nonobvious are patentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103
(1976); cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966) (noting notorious difference between
standards applied by Patent Office and those applied by the courts).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (limiting term of patent grant to 17 years).
22. This is obviously the case if a patent owner engages in collusive conduct with other patent
owners, see W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 54-55; Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements,
20 J.L. & ECON. 309 (1978) (distinguishing patent licensing arrangements that create industry cartels
836
Patents and Predation
mize monopoly profits will not minimize deadweight loss. Although cer-
tain licensing restrictions conceivably could both reduce allocative
inefficiency and increase a patent owner's profits relative to other methods
of monopolistic exploitation,2" a patent owner is as likely to choose meth-
ods inconsistent with society's interest in minimizing deadweight loss.
Certain economic aspects of the patent owner's decision make the diver-
gence between private incentives and society's interests likely. These eco-
nomic factors include the use of patented technology in variable propor-
tions with other inputs,2" the ability of patent owners to engage in price
discrimination, 5 and the likelihood that patent owners will be motivated
by strategic concerns.26
from those that promote productive efficiency). This Note, however, is concerned with how this trade-
off is affected by unilateral conduct. Bowman denies that vertical restrictions unilaterally imposed by
the patent owner have any monopoly-extending potential. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 55. But
see Williamson, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 647, 654-659 (1974) (criticizing Bowman's assertion).
23. Bowman offers several examples of licensing restrictions that might enhance efficiency: tying
arrangements, W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 87, price discrimination, id. at 111-12, and resale price
restrictions, id. at 131-39.
24. A variable proportion technology is one in which a given amount of final output can be pro-
duced using different mixes of factor inputs. In the vocabulary of microeconomics, the elasticity of
substitution among inputs is greater than zero. See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 7, at 195-201 (defining
elasticity of substitution). If A and B are substitutes in the production of C, but at least some of A is
required to produce C and a patent owner has a monopoly only over input A, he will be able to
increase his profits by extending operations into the production of C either through vertical integra-
tion or a tying arrangement. Whether this extension-of monopoly power enhances or diminishes wel-
fare depends on the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of demand. See Warren-Boulton, Verti-
cal Control with Variable Proportions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 783 (1974) (analysis of welfare implications
using numerical simulations); see also Mallela & Nahata, Theory of Vertical Control with Variable
Proportions, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1009 (1980) (clarifying Warren-Boulton's results through explicit
analytical expressions of manner in which vertical control affects price of final output and input
demands); Posner, The Chicago School, supra note 14, at 937 (conceding that vertical restrictions
involving monopolized input used in variable proportions with other inputs could have adverse wel-
fare consequences, but expressing reservations as to empirical significance of this possibility).
The ambiguous net welfare effect can be explained intuitively. If the patent owner charges a mo-
nopoly price for A, independent producers of C will choose an inefficient input combination for pro-
ducing C. By imposing some sort of vertical control over these independent producers, the patent
owner can improve the efficiency of producing C. See F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 300-01 & n.7.
While enhancing productive efficiency, monopolization of product C, made possible by the patent
owner's monopoly, will affect the deadweight loss society incurs. The combination of gains in produc-
tive efficiency and the uncertain effect on allocative efficiency makes the total welfare effect uncertain.
25. A patent owner who discriminates among purchasers by charging different royalties for his
patent based on the market in which the licensee operates (this is referred to as third-degree price
discrimination, see F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 316) will be able to increase his profits, but such a
practice may diminish social welfare. See Posner, The Chicago School, supra note 14, at 935 nn.24-27
(criticizing R. BORK, supra note 6, at 397, for assuming that price discrimination will always be
welfare-enhancing); see also J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-95 (2d
ed. 1969) (output effects of price discrimination will depend on relative shape of demand curves in
markets served by discriminating monopolist).
Under certain circumstances, a patent owner may legally engage in price discrimination. See USM
Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2455
(1983); Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 438 F.2d 733, 738 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
922 (1971). But see LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that evidence
supported Commission's finding that discriminatory royalties diminishing competition violated § 5 of
Federal Trade Commission Act).
26. See Gilbert & Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM.
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Antitrust policy provides a tool to resolve the conflict in patent policy
created by this divergence of private and social interests. To some extent,
courts have already employed the antitrust laws to police the manner in
which patent owners exploit their patents.2" These decisions, however,
have failed to articulate a persuasive standard of socially efficient patent
exploitation that recognizes the tradeoff between dynamic and static
efficiency.
In the absence of explicit statutory guidance, courts must fashion a legal
rule that balances these efficiencies and thereby reconciles the patent sys-
tem with antitrust policy. At the very least, Congress intended that a pat-
ent owner be permitted to act like a monopolist who sets a single price for
his monopoly output in order to maximize his short-run profits during the
term of the patent monopoly." The deadweight loss created by a single-
price monopolist provides a benchmark for a standard of socially efficient
patent exploitation.2" If the deadweight loss a patent owner creates is less
than this benchmark, his patent exploitation should be considered socially
efficient; if the allocative inefficiency he causes exceeds the benchmark, his
conduct must be deemed anticompetitive. Although this is not the only
conceivable standard available to courts,30 it is the only one that resolves
ECON. REV. 514 (1982) (arguing that current patent owner has incentives to engage in preemptive
patenting and other entry-deterring strategies if he fears competition from developers of new patents).
27. See infra pp. 846-49.
28. The single-price monopoly standard has frequently been invoked by commentators to evaluate
the relative social efficiency of a particular form of patent exploitation. See W. BOWMAN, supra note
6, at 64 (various kinds of patent restrictions "will be shown to be . . efficient socially, in terms of
consumer interest when compared with the monopoly alternative where use restriction is outlawed
and where a single uniform royalty rate is insisted upon for all prospective licensees"); Williamson,
supra note 22, at 659 (implying that welfare properties of vertical market restrictions should be evalu-
ated relative to case in which monopoly output is priced at uniform rate).
29. The reader is cautioned against regarding this standard of socially efficient patent exploitation
as a purely economic standard. It does not define a first-best optimum because it does not explicitly
evaluate the marginal benefits and costs of different forms of patent exploitation. Rather, it assumes
that the 17-year patent grant established by Congress provides the proper economic incentives for
innovation. Even as a second-best approximation, however, the conclusions derived from this standard
are valid only in a partial equilibrium sense; in other words, the standard ignores the effects of the
price distortion in other markets.
30. At one extreme, courts could make the preservation of patent owners' incentives their primary
concern; deadweight loss could be minimized subject to the preservation of patent owners' incentives.
This rule, strictly applied, would entirely exempt patent exploitation from antitrust scrutiny. Since
incentives to innovate are an increasing function of reward, regardless of whether the reward has its
source in efficient or anticompetitive conduct, no conduct would ever be prohibited if courts were
concerned only with preserving incentives. Under such a blanket exemption, the patent owner's profit-
maximizing calculus would not reflect the additional costs he inflicts on society by choosing discrimi-
natory or strategic methods of exploitation.
The other extreme-to condemn all forms of patent exploitation that create allocative ineffi-
ciency-is equally unappealing. Such a policy would eliminate the patent system, since patent ex-
ploitation necessarily entails some deadweight loss.
Some commentators have suggested looking to the "competitive superiority" of a patent as a more
palatable alternative for evaluating a patent owner's conduct than either of these extremes. See W.
BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 54; Furth, Price-Restrictive Patent Licenses Under the Sherman Act, 71
HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1958). Furth narrowly defines this standard as the additional economic
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the second-best problem society faces: It allows patent owners to maximize
their returns subject to a given level of deadweight loss.
C. The Welfare-Enhancing Properties of Patent Licensing
The first step in assessing the social efficiency of a patent owner's li-
censing decision is to determine whether he has an incentive to license his
patent efficiently. If a firm other than the patent owner has a cost advan-
tage relative to the owner in the production of goods that use the patent
technology, the patent owner who attempts to maximize short-run profits
will benefit from a licensing agreement.31 In the absence of transaction
costs, and given perfect information about production costs of competitors
and consumer demand, licensing will lead to productive efficiency in ex-
ploiting the patent: The most cost-efficient firm will employ the patented
technology.32 Under these conditions, the efficient producer's monopoly
rents a patent owner earns on patented products absent any suppression of rivalry among competitors
because of the patent. See id. at 816-17, 838. This standard would essentially allow a patent owner to
obtain a reward commensurate with the cost-savings attributable to the patent. See id. at 838-41.
Bowman offers a broader interpretation of competitive superiority that looks to the added economic
surplus created by a new invention as a measure of the deadweight loss society will tolerate from a
patent owner's non-collusive efforts to maximize his profits. Thus, Bowman's approach differs from
Furth's in two respects. Bowman would permit restrictions on unpatented products that enhance over-
all efficiency. More importantly, Bowman is willing to offset loss in consumer surplus with gains in
producer surplus. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 128-30 (noting differences between his own and
Furth's concept of competitive superiority).
The fact that the two definitions are slightly different is unimportant in weighing their merit
against the standard of socially efficient patent exploitation proposed here. Bowman's version of com-
petitive superiority will always be more permissive, and Furth's will generally be more permissive,
than the socially efficient standard. For example, a unilateral refusal to license would always be
tolerated under a standard of competitive superiority. Neither Furth nor Bowman offers any justifica-
tion for this toleration. This shortcoming is most noticeable in Bowman's book, which seeks to demon-
strate that some licensing restrictions will induce greater efficiency in exploitation than exploitation by
a single-price monopolist, W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 113-16 (using diagrammatic exposition of
price discrimination problem to argue that efficiency considerations favor a socially efficient standard).
See supra note 29. When faced with a choice between standards of social efficiency and competitive
superiority, however, Bowman inexplicably chooses the latter. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 88
(arguing that tying arrangement using inputs in variable proportions should be lawful, because such
an arrangement can never violate standard of competitive superiority, even if arrangement is not so-
cially efficient); id. at 112-13 (patent owner's price discrimination should not be condemned even if it
leads to reduction in monopoly output, that is, diminished social welfare relative to welfare with
uniform monopoly pricing).
Baxter has suggested an entirely different standard built around the commercial exigencies of pat-
ent exploitation: He would limit restrictions on utilization of unpatented goods as narrowly as is
economically feasible given the legislatively determined balance between costs and benefits inherent in
a patent system. Baxter, supra note 18, at 313. Like the standard of competitive superiority, Baxter's
standard assumes that a patent owner's unilateral restrictions with respect to patented goods should be
legal. Although Baxter's effort to minimize the economic effects on unpatented products appeals to
economic intuition, it lacks any solid economic justification.
31. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 70.
32. See McGee, supra note 16, at 139-40.
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price will be lower and monopoly quantity will be greater than the price-
output combinations of less efficient producers.3 3 With respect to produc-
tive efficiency, society's interests and the patent owners' incentives coin-
cide: Firms' profit-maximizing behavior will encourage socially efficient
patent exploitation.
Licensing arrangements will not always give the most efficient user ac-
cess to the patent technology when the patent owner includes the costs of
monitoring an agreement in his licensing decision, or when information
necessary to exploit a patent efficiently-information regarding the patent
owner's production costs, the production costs of prospective licensees, and
the extent of market demand and growth-is unavailable to patent own-
ers." Neither the patent owner nor society benefits, however, from the
social costs occasioned by the existence of transaction costs or imperfect
information; the patent owner therefore has an incentive to minimize these
costs.3  Thus, while transaction costs and imperfect information contribute
to the inefficiency of using a patent system to allocate intellectual property
rights, they do not fundamentally alter the conclusion that the discretion
of patent owners as to licensing generally enhances productive efficiency.
D. Anticompetitive Incentives and the Patent Owner's Decision to
License
If patent owners were concerned only with short-run profit maximiza-
tion, the welfare-enhancing properties of patent licensing would make fur-
33. This result can be demonstrated by comparing the output decisions of an efficient monopolist
to those of a relatively less efficient monopolist. Both face the same negatively sloping demand curve:
At lower prices there is greater demand. A total revenue function can be computed by multiplying
price and quantity (q) for each point on the demand curve, and may be expressed (or graphed) as a
function of q. The slope of the total revenue curve at any q is the marginal revenue, which will also
decrease as a function of q. A monopolist chooses quantity at the point where marginal costs equal
marginal revenue. By definition, the efficient monopolist's marginal costs are everywhere less than
those of his less efficient counterparts. He will therefore choose to produce more than the inefficient
monopolist because his lower marginal costs allow him to keep producing profitably beyond the less
efficient monopolist's profit-maximizing level of output. At this higher level of output, consumers will
face lower prices because of the negatively sloping demand curve.
34. Information known by licensees is relevant to the patent owner's choice of method to set
royalties. Licensees have incentives not to reveal the true extent of their cost efficiency to a patent
owner, except to demonstrate that they are at least as efficient as any other user. The combination of
informational asymmetry (the two transacting parties have access to different information) and the
fact that it is in the interest of one party to withhold information gives rise to information impacted-
ness. See O. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26-
35 (1975). The impediment to productive efficiency created by information inpactedness can be dimin-
ished through imposition of price and output restrictions on licensees. See Priest, supra note 22, at
318-23.
35. Although the patent owner will try to minimize transaction costs subject to a given level of
profit, occasionally he will choose to incur transaction costs in order to maximize profits in situations
that diminish social welfare. See Williamson, supra note 22, at 659-60; cf. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra




ther judicial scrutiny of the licensing decision unnecessary. If, as is more
likely, a patent owner seeks to maximize long-run profits, 6 he may re-
spond to incentives that will not induce socially efficient patent licensing.
The limited duration of a patent is one factor that will make the patent
owner's long-run profit-maximizing calculus diverge from its short-run
counterpart. In the long run, a patent owner will try to maximize not
merely the economic rents he derives from his legal monop-
oly-appropriately discounted 3 7-but, in addition, the value of any
residual market power 8 attributable to his patent upon its expiration. If a
patent owner is able to increase his residual market power through strate-
gic behavior, there is no reason to assume that his licensing decision will
be socially efficient.
Recent economic models of entry-deterring behavior demonstrate that a
firm already established in a market can make irreversible commitments
of productive resources, such as plant capacity, in order to affect adversely
the profit opportunities of potential competitors in a post-entry equilib-
rium. 9 By diminishing the potential profits of foreseeable competitors, ir-
36. F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 229. Some economists have questioned the realism of assuming
that the sole objective of firms is to maximize profits. See generally id. at 29-41 (surveying recent
criticism of profit-maximization hypothesis). The implications of non-profit-maximizing behavior for
patent licensing are unclear.
37. Throughout this Note, it is necessary to compare profits from different time periods. Strictly
speaking, however, a dollar earned a year from now is worth less to an individual than the dollar he
earns today. In order to make the dollar-denominated values from different time periods comparable,
that is, to obtain the present value of each dollar, one must discount the value of future dollars earned
by the time value of money. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 26-39 (1981) (explaining methods of calculating present value). For the remainder of this
Note, all profits and costs are assumed to be in present value terms unless otherwise specified.
38. Market power, loosely defined by courts as "the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion," United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956), refers in economics
to a firm's ability to increase profits by restricting its own level of output and maintaining prices above
marginal cost.
The Lerner Index-the difference between price and marginal cost expressed as a percentage of
price-is a frequently used approximation of market power for a single dominant firm. This measure
can be used to show that market power is inversely related to the market elasticity of demand (the
percentage change in quantity demanded for a one percent change in price) and the elasticity of
supply of other fringe competitors (the percentage change in quantity supplied by competitors for a
one percent change in price). In addition, holding all other factors constant, market power is directly
related to a firm's market share. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 937, 944-51 (1981).
39. For excellent non-technical introductions to the relationship of binding commitments of re-
sources to entry-deterrence, see Dixit, Recent Developments in Oligopoly Theory, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 12-14 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Dixit, Oligopoly Theory]; Salop, Strategic
Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 335 (1979).
The commitment of resources can take a number of different forms. See Dixit, The Role ofInvest-
ment in Entry-Deterrence, 90 ECON. J. 95 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dixit, Entry-Deterrence] (pro-
duction capacity); Prescott & Visscher, Sequential Location Among Firms with Foresight, 8 BELL J.
ECON. 378 (1977) (plant location); Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast
Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305 (1978) (brand proliferation); Gilbert & Newbery, supra note,
26 (patenting) (Their analysis includes an examination of the entry-deterring potential of investments
in excess capacity when coupled with preemptive patenting.)
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reversible investments in plant and equipment can discourage entry by
those competitors into the incumbent firm's market."' A patent that con-
fers competitive superiority on its owner may permit him to act like an
established firm in an entry-deterring model.4 ' By using his technological
superiority to gain first-mover advantages, which allow him to deter en-
try,42 the patent owner can augment his long-run market power and en-
hance the value of his residual market power upon expiration of his
patent.
A patent owner who refuses to license his patent in order to deter long-
run entry will diminish social welfare. During the term of the patent, the
patent owner seeking to deter entry may reserve the patent for his own
exclusive use when he is not in fact the most efficient user of the technol-
ogy. The patent owner's relatively higher marginal costs will lead him to
choose a smaller monopoly output than his more efficient competitors
would have chosen.43 Moreover, social welfare in the post-expiration pe-
riod will be diminished because the patent owner will possess greater
40. See Dixit, Entry-Deterrence, supra note 39 (suggesting situations in which investment in ca-
pacity will allow firm to deter entry successfully); see also Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and
Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977) (arguing that investment in capacity can be used to
affect potential entrant's competitive opportunities, and comparing excess capacity hypothesis with
limit pricing strategies); Spence, Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 1, 11-14 (1979) (examining investment in capacity as entry-deterring strategy in growing mar-
ket structure in which firms face financial constraints).
41. See Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 26, at 515, 519, 524. Although Gilbert and Newbery
focus primarily upon the entry-deterring potential of preemptive patenting, they explicitly note the
applicability of their argument to other forms of entry-deterring behavior, such as investment in excess
capacity.
42. "First-mover advantages may be said to favor those firms which, for whatever reason, were
there [in a market] early." 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 34, at 216. One such advantage is the ability
to make binding commitments of resources in order to affect adversely the profitability of competitors.
See Salop, supra note 39, at 335.
The initial or dominant firm in a market may receive other first-mover advantages that enhance
social welfare but that can also be exploited so as to discourage entry. These benefits include: the
opportunity to achieve economies of scale, see Schmalensee, Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry,
89 J. POL. ECON. 1228 (1981) (suggesting for certain specifications of demand that effect of economies
of scale in deterring entry will be limited by the size of incumbent's capital investments); gains from
learning-by-doing, see Spence, The Learning Curve and Competition, 12 BELL. J. ECON. 49 (1981)
(discussing effect of learning curve phenomenon on competition); and brand loyalty among consumers,
see Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Schmalensee, Product Differentiation] (arguing that such advantages are
likely to be substantial). Although these competitive benefits may be relevant to understanding the
particular strategy undertaken by a patent owner, they will largely be ignored here because of the
complexity they introduce into the analysis. While consideration of these factors may be important to
the proper disposition of individual cases under the kind of legal standard advocated in this Note,
these factors are irrelevant to assessing the merits of the legal argument advanced here.
43. During the term of the patent, whether there is a reduction in social welfare will depend on
how a firm's investments in excess capacity affect its short-run cost functions. The patent owner could
increase his pre-expiration output by investing in excess capacity. See Spulber, Capacity, Output, and
Sequential Entry, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 503, 512 (1981). The owner's marginal costs may increase over
the short run, however, and may lead him to produce less in that period. See Stiglitz, supra note 8, at
187-88. Regardless of its effect on output in the pre-expiration period, entry-deterring behavior will
always diminish social welfare.
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market power as a result of his entry-deterring activities." License refus-
als that deter entry do not promote socially efficient patent exploitation
and therefore are justifiably condemned as anticompetitive.
Even if one concedes that a patent owner's refusals to license could be
anticompetitive in theory, one may continue to doubt that patent owners
will engage in such conduct. It has been argued that entry-deterring strat-
egies requiring investment in excess capacity will rarely be employed be-
cause such strategies are seldom profit-maximizing.4 5 A patent owner will
bear the otherwise avoidable costs of maintaining excess capacity only if
the additional profits from engaging in such a strategy exceed the costs of
strategic investments. If the patent owner and prospective entrants are ra-
tional actors, two conditions must be satisfied for the patent owner to
maintain excess capacity as a method of deterring entry: He must make
his production decisions on the assumption that other firms will alter their
own production plans in a predetermined fashion;46 and his best strategy
in the event of entry by a competitor must be to expand output. 
7
If a patent owner comes to dominate a market during the term of his
grant, the formal conditions that make entry deterrence profitable are
more likely to be satisfied. While the effect on market structure of ob-
taining a patent is unlikely to be dramatic or immediate in most instances,
there will be cases in which a patent owner can use his patent to displace
competition in an existing market. In such cases, the patent owner is
likely to recognize the effect of his own production decisions on the price
and output decisions of competitors, thereby satisfying the first condition.
44. Entry-deterring behavior enhances a dominant firm's market power by reducing both the sup-
ply elasticity of competitors and their market share. Because deadweight loss, see supra note 8 (defin-
ing deadweight loss), is an increasing function of market power, see Landes & Posner, supra note 38,
at 954 n.32, 991-96, behavior that increases a firm's market power will adversely affect social welfare.
See Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1790-92, 1809-10 (1982).
45. See Spulber, supra note 43, at 504, 512 (arguing that firms will maintain excess capacity only
under quite limited conditions). Although Spulber's analysis is extremely valuable in formulating
models that include investments in excess capacity, his conclusions should not be accepted without
scrutiny. First, highly stylized models in which actors pursue rational game-theoretic strategies ignore
the effects of uncertainty and financial constraints on firm behavior. Second, investment in excess
capacity is only one type of strategy in a vast array of entry-deterring models. Other forms of entry
deterrence may be preferred to an excess capacity strategy, or other forms of entry deterrence may be
used in conjunction with investment in excess capacity. See Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 26, at
519-21 (discussing use of investments in excess capacity in conjunction with preemptive patenting).
46. See Spulber, supra note 43, at 511-12. More precisely, the established firm acts as a leader in
a model with a Stackelberg equilibrium. In one variant of a Stackelberg duopoly model, one player is
cast as a follower, and the other player as a leader. The follower-here, the entrant-will make his
output decision assuming that the leader will not change his production decision in response to the
follower's production decision. The leader-the patent owner already established in the mar-
ket-chooses his level of output knowing how the follower will react in terms of production, and thus
will have an advantage. For an accessible explanation of Stackelberg gaming behavior, see K. COHEN
& R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FIRM: RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN A MARKET ECONOMY 240-43 (2d ed.
1975).
47. See Spulber, supra note 43, at 511.
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Whether a patent owner is likely to increase output in response to entry
will, of course, depend on his particular production function and the sen-
sitivity of the entrant's production decision to the monopolist's choice of
output."" Denying competitors access to patented technology may thus fa-
cilitate a patent owner's efforts to achieve market dominance.4
II. Reconciling Patent Rights and Antitrust Restrictions
From an economic perspective, a unilateral refusal to license a patent
can be the result of either efficient patent exploitation or anticompetitive
conduct. Courts have consistently ignored the anticompetitive potential of
such refusals, however, and have accorded immunity to the decisions of
patent owners denying competitors access to patented technology.5" Not
only are the reasons offered to support such decisions fundamentally un-
persuasive, they are inconsistent with the antitrust analyses courts have
applied to other forms of patent-related conduct. A court faced with a
refusal to license a patent should apply the same standards that are used
to determine whether other patent-related practices are exempt from the
antitrust laws. When it finds that a refusal is not entitled to antitrust
immunity, the court should determine whether the refusal amounts to an
antitrust violation.
A. The Inadequate Foundation for Current Judicial Practice
The willingness of courts to imply an antitrust exemption for refusals
to license stems from their unwarranted fears that imposing liability
would adversely affect incentives to innovate, and their underestimation of
the anticompetitive potential of such refusals. These fears are most
strongly expressed in the argument that subjecting some refusals to license
to antitrust liability would seriously undermine the incentive structure of
48. A patent owner will increase output in the event of another firm's entry if the profit-maximiz-
ing level of output for the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium exceeds the pre-entry monopoly output.
If the other conditions of Spulber's analysis are disregarded, there are additional reasons why an
owner may increase output in response to entry. For instance, the patent owner may engage in limit
pricing, that is, attempt to inhibit entry by reducing prices to a level at which a potential entrant
would find entry unprofitable. Although such a strategy sacrifices short-run monopoly profits, the
strategy may nevertheless prove profitable if it succeeds in forestalling entry by competitors. See F.
SCHERER, supra note 13, at 234-39. The success of this strategy depends upon the credibility of the
established firm's threat to resist entry of competitors. Limit pricing also may be successful if entrants
regard observed prices as a signal of the incumbent firm's marginal costs. See Salop, supra note 39, at
337.
49. But see Baxter, supra note 18, at 317 (arguing that patent owners will seldom gain long-run
market power from refusal to license). The models discussed here are limited by the restrictive as-
sumptions characteristic of game-theoretic models presupposing "super"-rational behavior. None of
the formal models discussed here considers the effect of financial constraints on the entrant, with the
exception of Spence, supra note 40, at 34. Thus, these models should not be interpreted to mean that
other anticompetitive scenarios are impossible.
50. See supra note 4.
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the patent system.51 This argument is clearly overstated. A rule that
merely limits owners' discretion to deny patent licenses would not sub-
stantially affect the rewards of patent owners." Refusals that are socially
efficient would be unaffected by such a rule." Even in cases in which a
court compelled licensing, a patent owner could still extract the value of
his patent monopoly through royalties.
A weaker form of this argument asserts that such an extension, al-
though perhaps justified in certain cases, risks sacrificing the economic
benefits of the patent system. 4 While this argument must be considered in
determining whether the benefits of imposing antitrust liability outweigh
the costs, it does not address the threshold question of whether the law
should scrutinize refusals to license. The practical issues of whether a rule
can be formulated that accurately discriminates between socially efficient
and anticompetitive licensing, and whether such a rule would provide ade-
quate notice to patent owners who are in violation, should be postponed.
A final legal argument for exempting unilateral refusals to license treats
a patent owner's freedom to refuse as a mere corollary of his recognized
right to suppress a patent completely. 5 This analogy ignores the very dif-
ferent effects these two actions have upon competition. A refusal to license
may allow a patent owner who reserves his patent for his exclusive use to
enhance his future market power. In contrast, suppression gives him no
strategic advantage, and therefore cannot be used for anticompetitive
51. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 648 (9th Cir. 1981); SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g on other grounds 463 F. Supp. 983
(D. Conn. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1016 (1982); see also Comment, Accommodating Patent and
Antitrust Law: Monopolists' Lawful Patenting Conduct and SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 60 B.U.L.
REV. 78, 107-08 (1980) (criticizing district court's opinion in SCM because standard of liability
adopted by court would have chilling effect on innovation).
52. See Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Indus., 610 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1979) (suggesting
that added income from licensing restrictions that violate antitrust laws is unlikely to affect patent
owner's incentives); Furth, supra note 30, at 829; Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy,
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 459 (1969).
53. But c. Note, supra note 8, at 785 (overly broad rule of antitrust liability with respect to
inventive activities may reduce expected return for legitimate forms of innovation). Although the ex-
pected return to legitimate innovative activities may be reduced by the possibility that courts will
mistakenly impose antitrust liability, this possibility can be minimized by formulating precise liability
standards.
54. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1012-15 (D. Conn. 1978) (holding that
damages, unlike injunctive relief, may not be obtained for refusal to license, because imposition of
damage liability would affect legitimate activities of inventors), afi'd on other grounds, 645 F.2d 1195
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
55. At least two cases support an unqualified right of owners to suppress their patents. See Spe-
cial Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1945) (holding patent owner entitled to receive patent
that he intended to suppress in order to favor his other patent); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (holding that non-use of patent does not render its owner's
rights unenforceable). These cases have in turn been used to argue that the patent owner enjoys an
unqualified right not to license. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215
(1980) (citing Continental Paper Bag in support of patent owner's right to refuse to license).
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purposes."6
B. Patent Exploitation and Antitrust Immunity
The reluctance of courts to scrutinize refusals to license patents stands
in sharp contrast with their willingness to police other forms of patent
exploitation. Although courts have recognized that the patent system ex-
presses a congressionally established exception to the antitrust laws, they
have limited this exemption to only those patent practices reasonably re-
lated to the reward Congress intended to provide individuals through cre-
ation of patent rights.5' The "legitimate scope of the patent grant" consti-
tutes the judicial standard for practices tolerated as reasonably related to
the intent of Congress.5"
The concept of socially efficient patent exploitation provides an eco-
nomic benchmark for determining the legitimate scope of the patent
grant.60 Under this interpretation, any method of patent exploitation not
56. Justice White, joined by three other Justices, distinguished patent suppression from a refusal
to license a patent on these grounds:
The fact that respondent may not refuse to license competing sellers of propanil who do not
purchase the product from it is not inconsistent with the notion that a patent holder is free to
suppress his invention or to reserve it entirely to himself. Respondent may discontinue all sales
of propanil and all licensing of its patented process and yet itself continue to use propanil in
the patented process without being guilty of patent misuse. But it may not sell propanil to
others, thus granting them patent licenses by operation of law, while refusing to license com-
peting sellers of propanil, thus effectively excluding them from the market.
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 234 n.10 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
Although Justice White's remarks addressed the exclusionary effect of the patent owner's practice in
unpatented product markets, his analysis implicitly argues for distinguishing between suppression and
other refusals to license based on their respective effects in markets after a patent expires.
57. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663 (1969); see United States v. Line Material Co., 333
U.S. 287, 310 (1948); cf. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) (patent
and antitrust laws reflect compromise by Congress between equally important policies of stimulating
inventions and protecting competition).
58. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926) (holding price-restrictive patent
licenses immune from antitrust scrutiny when patent owner acts alone). The application to price-
restrictive licenses of the general rule regarding the scope of a patent is controversial. On two occa-
sions, the rule of General Electric relating to price-restrictive licenses narrowly survived challenge. See
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (holding particular price-restrictive license
illegal, but Court equally divided as to whether all such licenses are illegal); United States v. Huck
Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), afl'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 382
U.S. 197 (1965). The wisdom of General Electric's use of the legitimate scope of the patent grant as
the test for antitrust liability, however, is generally accepted, even by critics of General Electric. See
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST LAW § 185 (1976).
59. For examples of particular restrictions found to be within the scope of the patent owner's
grant and therefore not subject to antitrust scrutiny, see Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d
407, 417 (6th Cir. 1973) (territorial restriction upon foreign licensees, prohibiting export of output to
United States), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); United States v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp.
1118, 1149-50 (D.N.J. 1976) (packaging restrictions to prevent bulk sales); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657, 661 (D.N.J. 1951) (output restriction), al'd, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954). But see Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith
Co., 329 U.S. 637, 647-48 (1947) (arguing that, although grant-back provision in patent license did
not exceed the legitimate scope of patent, practice was not necessarily immune from antitrust laws).
60. See supra pp. 838-39 (discussing standard of socially efficient patent exploitation). The use of
Patents and Predation
socially efficient, and hence anticompetitive, is beyond the legitimate scope
of a patent. Those refusals to license that do violate the standard of social
efficiency should not be immune from the antitrust laws. The most per-
suasive justification for using this standard to define the scope of a patent
is the lack of a coherent alternative: Defining the scope of a patent with-
out reference to economic considerations will only lead to an imprecise
and arbitrary rule.61
This economic condemnation of anticompetitive refusals to license a
patent is fully consistent with the existing doctrine of patent misuse,
which identifies and condemns certain practices used to extend illegiti-
mately the scope of the patent.6 2 Although patent misuse will not always
imply an antitrust violation, 3 once a practice is found to constitute patent
misuse, it is no longer immune from the antitrust laws.64 Patent-related
economic analysis in analyzing licensing restrictions has been implicitly endorsed by courts. See USM
Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that
determinations of patent misuse be based on evaluation of competitive effects of challenged restriction),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2455 (1983); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H, 670 F.2d
1122, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that challenged patent restriction violates antitrust laws only if
it unreasonably restrains trade).
61. Compare the Court's conclusion in Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902):
The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any
conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property,
imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or
sell the article, will be upheld by the courts.
with its conclusion in United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942): "Since patents are
privileges restrictive of a free economy, the rights which Congress has attached to them must be
strictly construed so as not to derogate from the general law beyond the necessary requirements of the
patent statute."
Admittedly, these are rhetorical extremes, but they demonstrate the implicit danger of the legitimate
scope standard: The standard itself may be used as a conclusory label rather than as a tool to analyze
patent conduct. To treat the legitimate scope of the patent as a formal legal doctrine whose application
is independent of policy considerations is to engage in the circular legal reasoning that Felix Cohen
excoriated as the .'thingification' of property." Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 813 (1935).
62. The patent misuse doctrine was formally recognized in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942). A long line of cases preceding Morton Salt, however-beginning with
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)-implicitly relied on the
doctrine. The Motion Picture case established that the legitimate scope of a patent was the controlling
issue in defining patent misuse. Id. at 516. The origins of the patent misuse doctrine are discussed
extensively in both the majority opinion in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,
189-99 (1980), and in Justice White's dissent, id. at 224-30 (White, J., dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969); Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942). Dictum in Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944), suggesting that patent misuse amounts to an
antitrust violation, has been criticized. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 254 (1951).
64. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) (patent affords no
immunity from antitrust sanctions when similar patent-related conduct has been condemned as patent
misusp). The standards for patent misuse and antitrust immunity for patent-related conduct are virtu-
ally identical. Though this essential equivalence is rarely recognized explicitly, antitrust and patent
misuse cases frequently cite to each other for authority in defining the legitimate scope of a patent
owner's rights. Thus, in United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942)-an antitrust
case-the Supreme Court cited Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942)-a patent
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conduct that does not constitute patent misuse cannot serve as the basis for
an antitrust violation.65
Anticompetitive refusals to license conform to a well-established pattern
of conduct condemned by courts as patent misuse. Prominent among such
condemned practices are tying arrangements between patented and unpat-
ented products. 6 Courts perceive such arrangements as attempts by the
patent owner to extend or leverage market power in the patented-product
market to other product markets."7 Although the economic underpinnings
of leveraging have been severely criticized,6" the tying cases provide legal
precedent for the more economically justifiable condemnation of anticom-
petitive refusals to license.
An anticompetitive refusal to license and a tying arrangement differ in
that the refusal is an attempt to perpetuate market power rather than to
extend it across product markets. In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,69 however, the
misuse case, asserting that monopoly beyond the scope of the patent constitutes patent misuse-to
support its conclusion that a patent affords no immunity from the antitrust laws for a monopoly not
within its legitimate scope. Similarly, in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304
U.S. 175, 181, afJd on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938)-a patent misuse case-the Court cited
United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)-an antitrust case-for the proposition
that conduct within the legitimate scope of the patent grant could not constitute patent misuse.
65. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) (implying that
injunction against patent owner sought under antitrust laws could not be obtained without finding of
patent misuse); cf. United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973) (in allowing government
to seek compulsory licensing of patent as remedy for patent misuse when antitrust violation arising
from patent licensing restriction had been established, court implicitly recognized patent misuse as
precondition for patent owner's antitrust liability).
66. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 491, 493 (1942); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917); cf International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (tying arrangement involving patented input violates § 1 of Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 136-
37 (1936) (tying arrangement involving patented input violates § 3 of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1982)).
67. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1931); cf Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,
309 U.S. 436, 456-59 (1940) (licensing used to organize price-fixing conspiracy to leverage patent
monopoly beyond patent's competitive superiority).
68. If capital markets are perfect, a firm with market power cannot increase that power through a
tying arrangement so long as the tied products are used in fixed proportions. W. BOWMAN, supra note
6, at 70-76. The welfare effects of tying arrangements when inputs are used in variable proportion
are less settled. At the very least, there are plausible explanations for tying arrangements other than
leveraging, such as price discrimination or circumvention of government regulation. See R. BORK,
supra note 6, at 372-81. Richard Schmalensee has examined a more general variety of tying arrange-
ment in which a firm possessing a monopoly in a necessary input (the fixed input) used in variable
proportions with another input (the variable input) ties sales of the two inputs. He shows that this
tying arrangement will probably be welfare-enhancing if the variable input is priced above marginal
cost, but that predation may be present if that input is priced below marginal cost. Schmalensee,
Monopolistic Two-Part Pricing Arrangements, 12 BELL J. ECON. 445, 462-63 (1981).
Whether tying arrangements in fact permitteJ" leveraging in cases in which they were condemned is
beside the point in analyzing the leveraging potential of refusals to license patents. If a sound theoreti-
cal basis for leveraging with respect to certain practices can be constructed, then the law's sanctions
should be directed at them. W. BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 60.
69. 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (holding license requiring royalty payments for output after patent's expi-
ration unenforceable). The language of the majority opinion makes the analogy between market ex-
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Supreme Court held that such a distinction was without legal significance.
Attempts to perpetuate the rewards of owning a patent beyond the pat-
ent's term exceed the patent's legitimate scope as much as attempts to
extend the legal monopoly of a patent to unpatented products.
C. Patent Exploitation and Antitrust Liability
If a particular refusal to license is not immune from antitrust scrutiny,
courts evaluating that refusal must proceed to determine whether it consti-
tutes an antitrust violation. Section 2 of the Sherman Act,"0 which pros-
cribes both monopolization71 and attempted monopolization, 2 extends to
unilateral conduct that would be lawful in the absence of any intent to
create or maintain a monopoly. 3 Refusals to deal constitute one form of
discretionary conduct repeatedly condemned as anticompetitive when em-
ployed by monopolists for the purpose of excluding competition.74 Because
a refusal to license a patent poses the same issue of misuse of monopoly
power presented by a unilateral refusal to deal,7 5 a refusal to license
tension and patent duration explicit:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage
of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond the life of
the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing the sale or
use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.
Id. at 33. For two different views on the economic merits of Brulotte, compare W. BOWMAN, supra
note 6, at 232-35 (criticizing) with Baxter, supra note 18, at 327-29 (defending).
The Court's language allowing a patent owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate does
not permit the owner to demand royalties so high as to discourage prospective licensees who are more
efficient producers than the patent owner. His right to set high licensing fees is qualified; royalty
structures set to facilitate leveraging should be prohibited. Although the Brulotte Court's holding
specifically addressed royalties on products with technology on which the patent had expired, a patent
owner who sets an unreasonably high royalty with the sole purpose of perpetuating his market power
beyond his patent's expiration violates the spirit if not the letter of that holding.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
71. "The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
72. The offense of attempted monopolization consists of two elements: specific intent to monopo-
lize, and dangerous probability of success. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153
(1951); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
73. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951) (citing United States v. Col-
gate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)) (attempted monopolization); see also United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343-44 (D. Mass. 1953) (holding that monopolist's leasing
program constituted exclusionary conduct, a necessary element of the offense of monopolization, al-
though conduct itself did not violate § 1), afid per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
74. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (refusal to sell or wheel
electrical power to competing municipal power plants); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143, 154-55 (1951) (refusal to sell newspaper advertising space to patrons of radio advertiser); Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927) (manufacturer-retailer refused to sell
product to competing retail outlet); see also Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 859-63 (6th
Cir. 1979) (regional distributor of periodicals refused to deal with competing independent distributor)
(vacating judgment for defendants).
75. This Note addresses only unilateral refusals to license a patent. A refusal to license that re-
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should be analyzed using the same antitrust standards.7 6
Proof of market power in a relevant market is a necessary element of
the offense of monopolization.7 Moreover, ascertaining the extent of a
firm's monopoly power is an integral step in establishing attempted mo-
nopolization.78 The competitive superiority of a particular patent-a mea-
sure of that patent's economic superiority relative to its nearest substitute
technology-serves as an indication of the market power possessed by the
patent's owner. 9 Even if a patent owner's market power is currently
small, his patent may endow him with the potential to monopolize a par-
ticular product market successfully. 0
In addition to market power, some form of exclusionary conduct is nec-
essary to establish liability for unilateral conduct under section 2.8" Al-
suits from collusion among competitors clearly violates the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1969); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F.
Supp. 184, 202-03 (E.D. Pa. 1956), af'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957); United States v. Besser Mfg.
Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311 (E.D. Mich. 1951), affd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
76. One aspect of the antitrust doctrine condemning certain forms of unilateral refusals to deal
prohibits holders of essential facilities or unique resources from arbitrarily discriminating among po-
tential users or purchasers. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973)
(owner of regional power transmission equipment obligated to grant access to local power companies
where access was necessary to preserve competition); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.
383, 405 (1912) (association of competitors controlling geographically unique terminal facilities could
not discriminate against non-member competitors); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (jury should be instructed as to special obligations of stadium owners to deal with
competitors of lessee in event stadium facilities could not be duplicated and additional users could be
accommodated), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). Application of the essential facility doctrine to
patents, however, is inappropriate, because the doctrine would apply equally to efficient and to an-
ticompetitive refusals to license. Employing such a broad doctrine would impair the efficient operation
of the patent system. Although the essential facility doctrine may not be appropriate for condemning
refusals to license a patent, application of other antitrust doctrines proscribing monopolists' unilateral
refusals to deal should not be precluded.
77. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); General Business Sys. v.
North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1983); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609
F.2d 843, 849-53 (6th Cir. 1979).
78. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (to
establish § 2 monopolization claim for fraudulent procurement of patent, court must appraise exclu-
sionary power of illegal patent claim in terms of relevant market for product involved); see, e.g.,
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 911 (1981); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). But see, e.g., General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699
F.2d 965, 975-76 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding failure to establish market power in a relevant market
precluded finding of liability for attempted monopolization, although proof of market power would be
unnecessary for some types of conduct); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Bak-
ing Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1029-30 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1981) (suggesting proof of market power may be
relevant but not essential in establishing dangerous probability of success), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57
(1982).
79. The relevant product market for determining a patent owner's market power may include
more products than the patented product itself. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 704 F.2d
787, 796 (5th Cir. 1983).
80. See Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 954-55.
81. While, historically, courts insisted that purpose or intent to exercise existing monopoly power
was sufficient to trigger liability under section 2, see United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107
(1948), in practice, they always inferred intent from conduct, see, e.g., id. at 109 (unlawful acquisition
of market power); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1911) (conclusive presump-
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though the acquisition of market power through superior skill or business
acumen may have the effect of eliminating competitors, such conduct is
not condemned as exclusionary.8 2 A refusal to license a patent, however,
should not be considered privileged competitive conduct merely because
the patent is attributable to an owner's superior skill. Rather, courts must
inquire whether monopoly power legitimately achieved is being unlaw-
fully maintained. 8 A monopolist's conduct that unnecessarily excludes
competitors is sufficient to satisfy the conduct requirement of section 2. 4
A refusal to license is unnecessarily exclusionary when a patent owner
seeks to extend the benefits of his monopoly beyond the appropriate mea-
sure of reward for his superior skill. This measure is provided by the
previously defined standard of socially efficient patent exploitation. 5 The
violation of this standard by a patent owner's refusal to license indicates
that he could have procured his proper reward through a less restrictive
method of exploitation. Thus, a finding of patent misuse with respect to a
particular refusal to license provides conclusive evidence of a patent own-
er's willful maintenance of monopoly power.""
Making patent owners liable for anticompetitive refusals to license a
patent is not inconsistent with the decision of the Second Circuit in Ber-
tion of exclusionary intent based on firm's conduct both in acquiring and exercising monopoly power).
More recently, courts have phrased the intent requirement for monopolization in terms of conduct.
See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of monopoly power); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Similarly, courts will not find the requisite specific intent
for attempted monopolization in the absence of any conduct supporting such an inference. See Wil-
liam Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1030-31 (9th Cir.
1981) (discussing relevance of conduct in establishing specific intent and probability of success), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 85
(2d Cir. 1981) (anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct necessary to show attempted monopolization),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
82. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979) ("only considerations of fairness and the need
to preserve proper economic incentives prevent the condemnation of § 2 from extending even to one
who has gained his power by purely competitive means"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
83. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980); see United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (lawfully acquired
monopoly power may serve as basis for § 2 violation).
84. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1953) (hold-
ing defendant's practices unnecessarily excluded actual and potential competition), af/d per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954); see California Computer Prods. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613
F.2d 727, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1979); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 505 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); see also Transamerica
Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir.) (affirming
lower court's determination that design changes were not unnecessarily restrictive of competition),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983).
85. See supra pp. 838-39.
86. See Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing v. Best Seam, Inc., 616 F.2d 1133, 1141-42 (9th Cir.
1980) (implying that patent misuse necessary to establish patent owner possessed specific intent to
monopolize), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 78 (1983); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989,
1015-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (holding proof of patent misuse necessary and sufficient to establish that
patent owner who possessed monopoly power by virtue of his patent had violated § 2).
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key Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,8 7 in which the court held that an
inventor has no duty under section 2 to disclose trade secrets about a
product prior to its retail marketing. Although the creation of enforceable
legal interests in patents and the protection of trade secrets arise from the
common goal of promoting innovation, 8 the possibility for a patent owner
to exploit efficiently his property rights through less restrictive means dis-
tinguishes for antitrust purposes a patent owner's refusal to license from a
firm's refusal to disclose trade secrets. The commercial value of a trade
secret is lost once the secret is publicly disclosed. Patent protection, by
contrast, provides a mechanism for enforcement of an owner's intellectual
property rights even after the invention's public disclosure.8 9 Thus, the
commercial exigencies requiring exclusive possession of a technology are
diminished for a patent owner.
III. A Predatory Standard for Patent Licensing
Because a refusal to license a patent can evidence either efficient patent
exploitation or anticompetitive conduct, a per se approach either condon-
ing or condemning a patent owner's refusal to license his patent is unwar-
ranted.90 Antitrust scrutiny of refusals to license can promote social wel-
fare only if courts are able accurately and consistently to discriminate
between efficient and anticompetitive refusals, and patent owners are left
free to make efficient refusals.
The predatory conduct literature provides a useful model for developing
judicial standards to evaluate a patent owner's behavior when his conduct
gives an ambiguous signal of his competitive intent.' Just as a refusal to
license a patent may be consistent with either efficient or anticompetitive
patent exploitation, conduct such as price cutting and product innovation
87. 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Although the Berkey
court did not explicitly invoke principles of trade secret law in finding that a monopolist had no duty
to predisclose confidential business information, the court's citation of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), a leading trade secret case, suggests that it considered the information at
issue a type of trade secret. The information referred to by the court clearly embraces what is com-
monly known as a trade secret. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) (defining trade
secret but noting that trade secrets do not embrace all secret business information).
88. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-82 (1974) (patent and trade secret
law share common goal of encouraging innovation); id. at 475-78 (comparing differences in protection
afforded trade secrets under state law to that accorded patents by federal law).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976) (defining patent infringement); 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-293 (1976)
(describing patent owner's legal remedies for infringement).
90. CF Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 26, at 528 (preemptive conduct related to patent exploita-
tion is difficult to distinguish in practice from patent conduct evidencing superior skill).
91. For a helpful introduction to this vast literature, see Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Com-
peting Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981)
(surveying economic literature and problems courts are likely to encounter in applying economic stan-
dards); Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Einerging Trends, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 63 (1982) (summarizing burgeoning case law).
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can indicate either cost efficiencies or predatory intent. To analyze preda-
tory conduct, commentators have employed economic theory to character-
ize the behavior of firms that are genuinely efficient and competitive.9"
Firm conduct that deviates from certain economic relationships between
pricing and production costs is considered evidence of anticompetitive
behavior."
Comparing a firm's conduct to a behavioral benchmark is likely to be
both complex and imprecise.94 Some commentators have therefore supple-
mented their behavioral standards with a preliminary examination of
market structure. 5 Market structure provides additional information re-
garding the competitive effect of a firm's conduct96 and an indication of
the costs of errors in classifying conduct as either efficient or anticompeti-
tive.97 An initial examination of market structure facilitates courts' evalu-
92. The economic standards for analyzing predation include: simple cost-based standards, see
Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARv. L. REv. 697, 704-15 (1975); a sustainable price-reduction rule, see Baumol, Quasi-Perma-
nence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 4-6 (1979);
a combination of cost-based standards and market structure requirements, see Joskow & Klevorick, A
Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 242-55 (1979); profit-sacrific-
ing criteria coupled with market structure requirements, see Ordover & Willig, An Economic Defini-
tion of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 9-13, 15-22 (1981); and an out-
put-restriction rule, see Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284, 297-99 (1977). But see R. BORK, supra note 6, at 145-59 (arguing that rule proscribing
predatory pricing is undesirable because of improbability of its occurrence and rule's potential to
discourage honest price competition); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) (analyzing strategic models of predation and concluding that predatory
behavior should be per se legal).
93. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff bears burden of showing that prices are predatory when they are
below average total costs and above average variable costs, while defendant bears burden of showing
that prices are not predatory when they are below average variable costs), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57
(1982); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1980)
(although pricing below average variable costs is sufficient to establish prima facie case of predatory
pricing, predatory character of pricing above average variable costs depends on presence of other
factors).
94. See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 868,
890 (1976) (arguing that simple cost-based rules cannot substitute for a thorough factual examination
of alleged predator's behavior if court decisions are to be economically justified). A cost-based ap-
proach to predatory pricing that compares prices to costs may require different behavioral standards
for different ranges of costs. Compare Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 92, at 250-55 (advocating
tripartite behavioral standard: prices below average variable cost deemed sufficient but not necessary
for liability; prices between average variable cost and average total cost presumed illegal if defendant
is dominant firm and cannot show that strategy maximizes short-run profits; and prices above average
total costs presumed legal subject to sustainable price reductions rule) with Areeda & Turner, supra
note 92, at 712-13, 716-17 (necessary and sufficient condition for predatory pricing is price reductions
below average variable costs).
95. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 92, at 242-49; Ordover & Willig, supra note 92, at 10-
13.
96. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 92, at 227-31.
97. Id. at 218, 225-31. Joskow and Klevorick consider two types of error- the classification as
anticompetitive of conduct that is in fact competitive, and the classification as competitive of conduct
that is in fact anticompetitive. Id. at 223. Costs of the former type of error are measured in the
increased market power gained through anticompetitive conduct; costs of the latter type are reflected
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ation of firm conduct in two respects. First, it minimizes the costs of errors
associated with misclassification.98 Second, because of the complexity of
applying behavioral standards, structural analysis functions as a screening
mechanism to economize judicial resources."'
The structural and behavioral standards used to analyze predatory con-
duct can be captured in a two-tiered test that determines whether a patent
owner's refusal to license a patent is socially efficient.' 00 The first tier
looks at the incentives of patent owners to engage in anticompetitive pat-
ent licensing and the structural characteristics of the industry in which the
patented technology is employed; this tier seeks to determine whether a
patent owner would profit from anticompetitive refusals. Using the stan-
dard of socially efficient patent exploitation, the second tier develops a
behavioral criterion to evaluate a firm's competitive intent. This behav-
ioral standard tests the consistency of the royalty structure established by
a patent owner against the prices he charges for products he manufactures
using the same patented technology.
A. First Tier: Is Anticompetitive Behavior Profitable?
The profitability of anticompetitive behavior for a patent owner will
depend on the structure of the market in which he competes.' 0 ' To be
profitable, an anticompetitive refusal must generate sufficient additional
profits in the post-expiration period to offset any profits a patent owner
sacrifices in the short-run by refusing to license his patent.'0 2 Thus, deter-
mining whether an anticompetitive refusal is profitable requires an evalu-
ation of the effects a refusal will have upon market structure in the post-
expiration period.
Courts should examine two factors to evaluate these consequences: the
market power created during the term of the patent, and the conditions of
market entry that will exist upon the patent's expiration. A patent own-
in discouraged productive efficiency. Id. at 223-24.
98. See id. at 224-31 (discussing relationship between market structure and error costs). Joskow
and Klevorick invoke decision theory-the study of optimal decision-making under conditions of un-
certainty-as the basis for their predatory pricing rules. Id. at 217-19. While the principles of deci-
sion theory are suggestive, their application is possible only in an informal sense: Actual estimates of
the probabilities and costs of errors are extremely rough.
99. Cf Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44, 354 (1982) (applica-
tion of per se rule justified by need to economize judicial resources).
100. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 92, at 240-45; Ordover & Willig, supra note 92, at 12-
13 & n.17.
101. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 92, at 235.
102. Thus, if A equals pre-expiration profits with licensing, B equals pre-expiration profits with
refusal, C equals post-expiration profits with licensing, and D equals post-expiration profits with
refusal, then in order for an anticompetitive refusal to be profitable, A plus C must be greater than B
plus D. Since an anticompetitive refusal implies that B is less than A, it follows that D must be
greater than C, and furthermore that D minus C is greater than A minus B.
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er's market power during the term of his patent provides an upper bound
estimate of residual market power upon expiration of the patent; market
power attributable to a patent can only diminish with time.1 3 The ab-
sence of substantial market power during the term of a patent therefore
precludes an inference that a refusal to license will be anticompetitive.
If a court finds that a patent leads to substantial market power, it
should focus on the conditions of entry into the market when the patent
expires. 10 4 The conditions of entry affect the rate at which a patent own-
er's residual market power will deteriorate.10 5 If the patent owner's mar-
ket is perfectly contestable upon the expiration of his patent 106--that is, if
the market does not favor established firms over entrants-courts should
presume that a patent owner's refusal to license is efficient, for his self-
interest will lead him to license efficiently.107 If the market will not be
perfectly contestable, however, courts should consider whether the impedi-
ments to entry that will exist upon expiration of the patent are signifi-
cantly greater than the impediments existing at the time of the refusal.
With the passage of time, several factors may present increasingly for-
103. Schmalensee, supra note 44, at 1793-94. Because market power is inversely related to supply
elasticity, see supra note 38, and the elasticity of supply increases over time, J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra
note 7, at 311, market power will decline in the long run.
104. It has been argued that the term "condition of entry" is more appropriate than "barriers to
entry." Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 92, at 227 (arguing that traditional "barriers to entry" con-
cept is easily misinterpreted and not suited for dynamic analysis of entry). The classic definition of a
barrier to entry is any cost of production that must be borne by a firm seeking to enter an industry but
is not borne by firms already in the industry. G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67
(1968). The problem with this definition is its failure to recognize that the time at which incumbents
and entrants incur costs is just as important in describing entry as the magnitude of their respective
costs. Incumbents can change the conditions of entry faced by potential competitors through pre-entry
investments in such resources as capacity. These commitments constitute entry barriers in a strategic
sense: Their purpose is to reduce the long-run profits of prospective entrants below zero, even if that
means smaller monopoly profits in the near term for the incumbent. See Salop, supra note 39, at 335;
see also F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 229-60 (discussing entry in dynamic framework); supra pp.
841-42. Thus, in analyzing conditions of entry, courts should look not solely at the costs entrants face
in entering a market, but also at the way in which those costs increase as their entry is delayed.
105. See Schmalensee, supra note 44, at 1794 (suggesting that rate at which market power decays
will be inversely related to size of entry barriers).
106. "A contestable market is one into which entry is absolutely free, and exit is absolutely
costless." Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982). Firms in such a market will make zero economic profits, exhibit productive
efficiency, and generally set prices equal to marginal costs. Unlike perfect competition, which shares
these properties, perfect contestability does not depend on the number of competitors in a market. In
order for a market to be perfectly contestable, several strong assumptions must be made. Potential
entrants must have access to the same technology as incumbents, and there can be no sunk costs. See
infra note 109. In other words, there must be perfect markets in durable goods. Also, consumers must
be able to react to the new entrant's prices more quickly than established firms can match the en-
trant's prices. See Bailey & Friedlaender, Market Structure and Multiproduct Industries, 20 J. ECON.
LIT. 1024, 1040-41 (1982).
107. A profit-maximizing patent owner will license efficiently if his market is perfectly contestable
because he cannot acquire any strategic advantages during the term of his patent. Because exit is
costless in a perfectly contestable market, competitors will enter whenever positive economic profits
exist. A patent owner would be unable to establish a credible threat against entry.
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midable impediments to entry. Although the need for commitment of large
amounts of capital may not itself inhibit entry, it may have such an effect
when coupled with other factors. Late entrants face a severe handicap if
they must pay higher risk premiums than incumbents to obtain the
financial capital necessary for entry,10 8 or if sunk costs comprise a signifi-
cant fraction of an entrant's capital requirements.'0 9 Similarly, if the scale
of the minimally efficient plant is large relative to total demand, and the
cost disadvantage of not operating at that scale is substantial, late entry
may be discouraged. Thus, whether a potential competitor foregoes entry
could depend on its assumption as to how the incumbent will respond to
entry. 1 Another disadvantage likely to be exacerbated by postponed en-
try, but unrelated to capital requirements, is the unwillingness of consum-
ers to switch from the products of established firms."'
108. When considered in an intertemporal context, capital costs can pose an entry barrier even in
the absence of imperfect capital markets. See Williamson, supra note 22, at 657-58 & n.30 (arguing
that incomplete information in capital markets could permit incumbent firm to inhibit entry by impos-
ing vertical restraints); see also Posner, The Chicago School, supra note 14, at 945 (conceding that
risk premium faced by later entrants constitutes barrier to entry, but questioning significance of bar-
rier for competition). But see Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. EcON. REV. 47, 50 (1982) (sug-
gesting that interest rate differential between incumbents and entrants should not be considered an
entry barrier when difference can be explained by established firm's reputation). The risk premium
competitors must pay on all capital borrowed to finance entry into a market after a patent expires
may be substantially higher than the risk premium they would have faced had the patent owner
granted them licenses during the term of the patent. The higher risk premium may accurately reflect
the increased chances of an entrant's failure; nevertheless, potential competitors are penalized for later
entry when they may, in fact, have been willing to enter the market at a time when the risk premium
was low.
109. See Baumol & Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and Sustainability of Mo-
nopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405, 418-19 (1981) (arguing that sunk costs constitute barrier to entry). Sunk
costs are those costs that an entering firm must bear in the short run even if it decides to cease
production. They are closely related to, although distinct from, fixed costs. Fixed costs are those pro-
duction costs that do not vary with the level of output in the short run; some of these costs may be
recoverable through resale or leasing if a firm decides to shut down. See id. at 406-07, 416-18.
110. See F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 243-48 (arguing that the larger the minimum optimal
plant size relative to overall capacity, and the greater the disadvantage of not operating at that scale,
the more effective an established firm will be in deterring large scale entry, as long as entrants believe
that established firm will maintain its output in response to entry).
In industries in which the optimal plant size is large relative to demand, entry by a potential
competitor will significantly reduce the competitive price. The reduction in price caused by a firm's
entry into a market might make entry unprofitable in the first place unless an incumbent reduced its
own output to accommodate entry. Alternatively, entrants can enter and operate at a less than efficient
scale. Many economists have argued that it is implausible for a firm to deter entry by threatening to
maintain its output. See, e.g., Dixit, Entry-Deterrence, supra note 39, at 95 (arguing assumption
unpersuasive because it requires either irrational or non-strategic behavior by incumbent firms);
Spulber, supra note 43, at 503-04 (criticizing assumption because of its inconsistency with rational
behavior in model of dynamic entry).
111. Consumers frequently obtain information about a specific brand of product through
purchases. The expense of determining the quality of a new brand as it enters the market may inhibit
a consumer's purchases of new brands and thus have the effect of imposing additional costs on new
entrants. See Schmalensee, Product Differentiation, supra note 42 (showing that pioneering brands
may receive long-lived advantages over other brands through simplified theoretical models in which
consumers learn about product quality from their own purchases); see also Joskow & Klevorick,
supra note 92, at 228-29 (arguing that potential competition will be less effective in constraining
Patents and Predation
B. Second Tier: Are a Patent Owner's Prices Consistent with His Roy-
alty Structure?
The second tier employs a behavioral test to determine whether an
owner's refusal to license is in fact anticompetitive in those cases in which
use of the first tier has determined that an anticompetitive refusal might
be profitable. This behavioral test has its foundations in the standard of
socially efficient patent exploitation. A patent owner violates this standard
by sacrificing short-run monopoly profits to obtain long-run market
power.
112
Choosing to be the exclusive producer of goods employing patented
technology is profit-sacrificing for a patent owner if that decision yields
less profits than would licensing during the term of the patent. In other
words, a patent owner who refuses to license is sacrificing profits when-
ever a prospective licensee is willing to pay him more to produce a unit of
patented output than the patent owner could realize producing it him-
self.""' A patent owner would never willingly sacrifice short-run profits in
the absence of anticompetitive purposes. Thus, a licensing decision that
willingly makes such a sacrifice cannot be socially efficient.
A rule prohibiting profit-sacrificing behavior requires that a patent
owner entertain offers from prospective licensees for use of a patent that
he is actually using or that he already has licensed.11 4 The patent owner
retains the right to set his own royalty structure, but the licensing fees
must be consistent with the prices at which he chooses to market patented
goods. 1 5 This rule is nothing more than a requirement of competitive
incumbent's market power in highly differentiated product markets).
112. Profit-sacrificing behavior is an important corollary of predatory conduct. See Ordover &
Willig, supra note 92, at 9 (defining predatory behavior as "a response to a rival that sacrifices part of
the profit that could be earned under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain viable, in
order to induce exit and gain consequent additional monopoly profit"); see also Joskow & Klevorick,
supra note 92, at 254 (pricing above average total costs may be predatory if it entails profit sacrifice).
113. Imposition of a rule prohibiting patent owners from establishing a royalty structure that is
profit-sacrificing would not be unprecedented. In Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 563-
64 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1018 (1972), the court compared the price at which a manufacturer sold an unpatented product
coupled with an implied license to use the product in a manner protected by the manufacturer's
patent, with the royalty fee he charged for an express license and his own cost of producing the
unpatented product. Since the cost of the royalty fee and the unpatented product far exceeded the cost
of the unpatented product with an implied license, the court concluded that the patent owner had
misused his patent. But see Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (patent
owner entitled to withhold patent necessary for use of unpatented product).
114. The rule is applicable regardless of whether the patent owner himself happens to be the most
efficient user of the technology he has developed. A sacrifice of profits barred by the rule occurs when
the patent owner or any licensee he has designated as the exclusive user of his patent is less efficient
than the prospective licensee denied access to the technology.
115. The consistency of a patent owner's prices and his royalty structure may be difficult to ascer-
tain when the licensing fee is not calculated on a per-unit basis, or when the license contains addi-
tional non-price restrictions. While a licensing fee can be levied as a lump sum or as a combination of
a lump sum and per-unit charge, an average licensing fee can be calculated if the level of output is
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consistency between prices and royalties: The expected per-unit profit on
output produced by the patent owner must be equal to or greater than the
per-unit royalties offered by licensees.116
Proscribing anticompetitive refusals to license a patent is less vulnerable
to the types of objections frequently levelled against rules imposing liabil-
ity for predatory pricing. If the market conditions for an anticompetitive
refusal are met, such conduct enjoys a high probability of successfully ex-
cluding competitors: A patent owner's exclusionary power is legally en-
known.
Restrictions on output, field of use, and end-product prices provide additional means by which a
patent owner can discourage prospective licensees. Patent holders should be entitled to use restrictions
to enhance efficient exploitation during the life of the patent, but they should not be allowed to use
restrictions to circumvent antitrust prohibitions meant to promote access to markets involving patented
technology. Courts should therefore determine whether challenged restrictions serve a commercial
purpose for patent owners and the extent to which these restrictions discourage licensees' production.
116. Although testing for competitive consistency appears simple, courts will almost surely en-
counter some difficulty applying it in particular cases. To obtain a reliable estimate of a patent own-
er's per-unit profit, courts will have to examine his costs. Problems of apportioning costs over time
and across product lines will make any calculation somewhat uncertain. See Joskow & Klevorick,
supra note 92, at 254 n.84. This uncertainty will never be entirely alleviated by the use of expert
witnesses.
An example might clarify the more fundamental problem of defining the appropriate standards to
use for different cost structures. Suppose a patent is necessary to produce a certain product and a
patent owner has begun production. In evaluating the competitive consistency of a patent owner's
price and licensing fee, a court should disregard the fixed costs a patent owner has already incurred,
because his profit-maximizing licensing decision does not depend on those costs. Instead, courts, like
patent owners, need consider only two factors: the licensing fee, R, and the difference between price,
P, and the patent owner's average variable costs, AC. There are three simple short-run cases. Case 1:
AC is constant. If AC is constant, P minus AC will be an exact measure of a patent owner's profit on
each unit of output. Competitive consistency would be violated if the patent owner rejected an R that
is greater than P minus AC. Case 2: AC is always decreasing over the relevant range of output. If AC
is always decreasing, then the production of the patented good is a natural monopoly and the most
efficient solution is to have only one producer. Unless a prospective licensee can offer an R greater
than the average per-unit profit a patent owner would earn on his final unit of output Qf -that is, an
R greater than P minus AC at Qf-the refusal to license is efficient. Case 3: AC is U-shaped, and a
patent owner without any licensees would produce beyond his minimum AC, that is, in the region
where AC is increasing with quantity. This case is perhaps the most troublesome. In the previous
cases, the choice of R effectively fixed the licensees' level of production; the licensee could earn no
economic profits not attributable to his superior efficiency in using the technology. Here, however, if
the patent owner fixes an R based on output exceeding the output at minimum AC, the licensee can
always earn positive profits-even if his efficiency is merely equal to the patent owner's-by reducing
his output and producing at lower AC. The patent owner could attempt to increase his own output to
cover his licensees' shortfall, but there is no guarantee that the resulting output of the patent owner
and licensee would be productively efficient. This problem can be remedied by making the licensing
fee a function of quantity.
If the patent owner has not begun production, a court will have to consider long-run cost and use
the difference between price and average total costs as the relevant measure of profit. Some difficulties
in allocating fixed costs may arise when the cost of producing the patented product in conjunction
with other products is cheaper than producing all of the product separately. See generally Panzar &
Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 268 (1981) (discussing relevant
measures of cost in multiproduct context).
The problem of competitive consistency can easily escalate if a patent owner is intent upon hamper-
ing a licensee's effort to remain in the market. For instance, the patent owner could engage in preda-
tory pricing after granting a license. To detect such behavior, courts could use ordinary predatory
pricing tests and adjust the patent owner's costs by imputing his licensing fee to his costs.
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forceable at little cost.""' In contrast, a firm employing predatory pricing
must rely on market mechanisms to exclude competitors, and therefore
will face a huge financial burden with no assurance of success. A test for
competitive consistency between a patent owner's prices and his licensing
fee will be easier for courts to apply correctly than any behavioral test for
predation. Predatory pricing tests can be criticized for assuming that cur-
rent output and investment do not affect future profitability and for ignor-
ing sudden changes in business conditions that affect pricing decisions."'
The test proposed here escapes this deficiency because it is not a test of
the consistency of costs and prices but rather a test of the consistency of
two different sets of prices, a product price and a licensing fee." 9
C. Effect on Incentives
The extension of antitrust principles to unilateral refusals to license
patents might be challenged for diminishing the incentives of firms to en-
gage in innovation. From an economic perspective, however, greater in-
centives are not always socially desirable. 20 In the absence of express di-
rection from Congress, courts should be wary of interpreting the patent
laws as exalting incentives to innovate at all costs.' 2 ' Innovation should be
encouraged only to the extent warranted by legislative policy. The test
proposed here uses the deadweight loss that would be created if a patent
owner behaved as a single-price monopolist to measure the costs a patent
owner should be permitted to impose on society. This standard is consis-
tent with the intent manifested by Congress through its decision to grant
inventors only limited monopolies.
A more sophisticated objection to the imposition of antitrust sanctions is
that a selective prohibition of refusals to license patents might affect firms'
innovation strategies.' 22 Although imitation and other less aggressive re-
117. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 149-55, 159-60, 347-49 (arguing that predation through gov-
ernmental process is likely to be a far more effective strategy of predation than predatory pricing).
118. For examples of some of these assumptions, see Areeda & Turner, supra note 92, at 713-15
(asserting that dominant firm will not benefit from promotional pricing except when used for preda-
tory purposes); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 92, at 251 n.77 (assuming that temporary shut-down
costs will not exceed costs of operating below average variable costs).
119. One reason why Easterbrook opposes a rule prohibiting predation is because it is impossible
to distinguish between efficient and anticompetitive conduct in situations involving strategic non-price
behavior. See Easterbrook, supra note 92, at 290. This criticism is not applicable to anticompetitive
refusals to license a patent because of the availability of a test for competitive consistency. The test
offers a reasonably clear standard that identifies when a patent owner's conduct is anticompetitive.
120. See Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 184.
121. Cf Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1972) (when consider-
ing rights of patent owners seeking to expand their privilege, courts must consider these claims "in
light of this Nation's historical antipathy to monopoly," and should not expand those rights in the
context of prior case law "unless the argument for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere
inference from ambiguous statutory language").
122. A recent simulation study examined the effect of a number of economic factors on the rate of
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search strategies will be more attractive to firms if the antitrust laws
guarantee firms' access to all significant innovations in a market,"'3 society
benefits from imitation because fewer resources are wasted in duplicative
research. Because patent owners could still obtain royalties for the dura-
tion of their patents, selective compulsory patent licensing is unlikely to
discourage inventors.
1"4
While prohibiting anticompetitive refusals to license will not diminish
incentives to innovate below the levels prescribed by Congress, the intro-
duction of antitrust sanctions will affect a firm's incentives to disclose in-
novations through application for patent protection."' Inventors may
choose to rely on protection under trade secret law, but they would do so
only if they were not the most efficient users of the technology. Moreover,
an inventor who eschewed patent protection would risk all potential royal-
ties on the chance that non-disclosure of his invention would forestall en-
try. Although the possibility of antitrust liability conceivably could dimin-
ish the rate at which innovation is diffused throughout an industry, 6 this
diminution in patent activity will not affect the rate of innovation itself.
127
Conclusion
Prevailing case law treats a patent owner's decision to license and his
choice of licensing restrictions as fundamentally different. This Note
draws upon recent developments in the economic theory of entry deter-
innovation and productive efficiency in a market that offered no patent protection. The factors in-
cluded market structure, the relative ease of imitating innovation, the latent potential of innovation to
improve productivity, and the relative degree of aggression with which innovators and imitators pur-
sued market share. Although the results varied with different parameter specifications, in a remarka-
ble number of cases imitation did not affect the rate of innovation, especially if imitators did not seek
market share aggressively. See R. NELSON & S. WINTER, supra note 9, at 337-48.
123. See F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 444-47 (arguing that firms may invest without patent
protection because of lags in imitating innovation, "advantages of competitive product leadership, and
the existence of nonpatent barriers to the emergence of a competitive market structure").
124. It has been argued that the potential for damage liability will further diminish the incentives
of inventors to innovate over and above the diminution in incentives caused by compulsory licensing.
See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1014 (D. Conn. 1978) (distinguishing equitable
and damage remedies for compulsory licensing), aff'd on other grounds, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). This argument is only partially correct. It assumes that
patent owners will be uncertain whether their own conduct violates the law. This assumption is
inapplicable where the standard of competitive consistency is dearly defined.
125. F. SCHERER, supra note 13, at 457 (firms' incentives to disclose innovations may be dimin-
ished although level of innovation may be maintained).
126. See Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40 (1982) (arguing that
complete elimination of patent system and inventor's consequent reliance on trade secret protection
would lead to greater static inefficiency because inventors would be more reluctant to license their
technology and would devote more resources to protecting their trade secrets, and imitators would
employ greater resources to discover them).
127. See F. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 66-75
(1977) (study of companies compelled to license patent as part of antitrust decree shows companies
reduced patenting activity but maintained research and development expenditures).
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rence and predatory pricing to show that the same economic approach
used to analyze licensing restrictions should also be used to analyze a pat-
ent owner's licensing decision. This decision will have anticompetitive
consequences only under exceptional conditions. The Note therefore pro-
vides an economic justification for the current reluctance of courts to con-
demn refusals to license. By identifying the anticompetitive problem asso-
ciated with unilateral refusals with greater precision, however, this Note
holds out the promise that antitrust prohibitions can be extended to con-
duct that is in fact anticompetitive without adversely affecting the legiti-
mate rewards of patent owners.
